A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate governance regulations by Shrives, Philip & Brennan, Niamh
Citation: Shrives, Philip and Brennan, Niamh (2015) A typology for exploring the quality of 
explanations  for  non-compliance  with  UK  corporate  governance  regulations.  The  British 
Accounting Review, 47 (1). pp. 85-99. ISSN 0890-8389 
Published by: Elsevier
URL:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2014.08.002 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2014.08.002>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/18021/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page.  The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A typology for exploring the quality of explanations for non-compliance with UK corporate 
governance regulations 
 
Philip J. Shrivesa, *, Niamh M. Brennanb  
 
a Newcastle Business School, Faculty of Business and Law, Northumbria University, City Campus East, Newcastle 
upon Tyne NE1 8ST, UK 
b UCD School of Business, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland 
 
 
(Published in the British Accounting Review, 2015, 47(1): 85-99. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2014.08.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Acknowledgements: The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
the paper from participants at the following conferences/seminars: Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on Accounting (APIRA) Conference, Kobe, 2013, Queensland University of Technology 
and the University of Sydney. We also thank Mahmud Al Masum from the University of Adelaide for 
his insights and also Anthony Devine from Northumbria University for his final proofreading. Finally, 
we thank the reviewers and editors for helping us bring our paper to publication standard. 
 
* Corresponding author.  
Email address: Philip.Shrives@northumbria.ac.uk  
Abstract 
Companies not complying with the UK Corporate Governance Code are required to provide 
explanations for non-compliance. This is the capstone of the ‘comply-or-explain’ system. There are 
no regulations about the content of those explanations, leaving shareholders and others to judge 
their appropriateness. The study develops a typology to assess the quality of corporate governance 
explanations for non-compliance of UK FTSE 350 companies based on seven quality characteristics. 
Code breaches generating the non-compliance explanations for analysis are identified for two 
accounting periods (2004/5 and 2011/12) relating to the 2003 and 2010 Codes (data for 2011/12 in 
brackets). 
 
There were 204 (125) non-compliant companies, 537 (253) Code breaches and 438 (208) 
explanations for non-compliance, an average of 2.6 (2.0) Code breaches and 2.2 (1.7) explanations 
per non-compliant company. Although compliance increased over the period examined, 
explanations were found to be of variable quality. Results suggest that companies need to improve 
the quality of their explanations if they are to be useful to users, notably location, complexity and 
specificity of explanations. There are also important questions raised about the work of auditors and 
their apparent silence. Companies are being encouraged to move towards compliance. We argue 
that this is against the ‘comply-or-explain’ philosophy which accepts that ‘one size does not fit all.’ 
Better quality of explanation is more important than compliance and thus companies may be 
unwittingly heading in the wrong direction. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, comply-or-explain, non-compliance, explanation, quality of 
explanations, typology  
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1. Introduction 
The essence of the UK Corporate Governance Code is flexibility, with companies able to choose 
whether or not to fully comply. Explanations of non-compliance with the Code requirements are the 
capstone of the ‘comply-or-explain’ system. However, study of these explanations has been “largely 
neglected” (Solomon, 2010, p. 156). Other authors also raise questions about the validity of a system 
that is self-regulated (Wymeersch, 2005) and is therefore open to abuse. For that reason alone, it is 
important to examine the quality of explanations for non-compliance.  
 
In a review of explanations for non-compliance, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2012a) 
highlights the gradual move towards (apparent) compliance with the Code in recent years and 
suggests that improving the explanations of the few remaining non-compliant companies might not 
be worthwhile in terms of the benefits obtained. However, a rather different view of significant non-
compliance is revealed by Grant Thornton (2011). Chris Hodge, Head of Corporate Governance at 
the FRC, writing in the Grant Thornton (2011, p.2) annual review of compliance with the Code admits 
“(I)t is not enough to simply say non-compliance suits one’s business model: stakeholders deserve to 
know exactly why this is the case and what arrangements ensure that, despite non-compliance, the 
business – and their interests – are protected.” Currently, UK companies have free rein over 
explanations in their annual reports. The Code is entirely silent as to what happens when non-
compliance occurs other than to require companies to provide an explanation. The essence of an 
explanation is that it should be of ‘equal quality’ to full compliance.  
 
The objective of the paper is to develop a typology based on seven quality characteristics from the 
prior literature and the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) conceptual framework 
(see Figure 1). A typology is a classification scheme which organises phenomena into groups on the 
basis of their similarity of key features (Bailey, 1994). Typologies can reduce complexity by 
highlighting similarities and differences. However, they can also oversimplify complex phenomena 
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and reify theoretical constructs by obscuring that they themselves are social constructs (Bailey, 
1994), so they need to be used with care. The seven quality characteristics in our typology are: (i) 
Location, (ii) Comprehensiveness, (iii) Originality/Mimetic behaviour, (iv) Length, (v) Complexity, (vi) 
Specificity and (vii) Attestation. This compares with Seidl, Sanderson, and Roberts (2013) quite 
different 12-component taxonomy of explanations which they empirically generate from their 
analysis of the discursive legitimacy tactics employed in explanations. Having first revealed the 
extent of non-compliance with the Code, the study applies the typology to analyse two sets of 
explanations (646 explanations) for non-compliance relating to years ending in 2004/5 and 2011/12. 
Our research suggests that companies do not provide high quality explanations. In a multi-theoretic 
approach, we use institutional theory and resource dependency theory to explore why this might be 
the case. 
 
The paper makes three contributions to the prior literature: 
(i)  The primary contribution is the development of a typology of quality characteristics especially 
developed for analysing non-compliance explanations which are more comprehensive than 
those in previous studies. Our typology complements the taxonomy of Seidl et al. (2013) by 
providing an alternative and quite different approach based on quality characteristics derived 
from the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) Conceptual Framework and the 
prior disclosure quality literature.  
(ii)  Explanations for non-compliance with governance codes remain relatively unexplored in the 
prior literature, with the exception of MacNeil and Li (2006), Pass (2006), Andres and Theissen 
(2008), Arcot, Bruno and Faure-Grimaud, (2010), Hooghiemstra (2012), and Seidl et al. (2013) 
whose research is summarised in Table 1. As such, this paper contributes to an understanding 
of this under-researched area. In addition, a wider range of disclosed non-compliance is 
analysed with greater depth than some previous studies which have only examined parts of 
companies’ non-compliance or restricted samples from the FTSE 350.  
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(iii)  The study examines different theoretical propositions than the predominantly agency 
theoretical lens adopted in the prior literature and Seidl et al.’s (2013) legitimacy theory 
perspective (see Table 1).  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Section 2 of the paper examines theory and accounting concepts in relation to quality of the 
explanations. Our typology is described in Section 3 and the results are discussed in Section 4. The 
paper ends with policy implications, a conclusion and suggestions for further research.  
 
2. Theoretical Basis 
A concern with corporate governance (as a subject), is that it has no conceptual framework and 
borrows from other closely related subjects almost in a ‘magpie’ like fashion, with a raft of theories 
to explain nearly every practice. For example, Abraham and Shrives (2014) refer to in excess of ten 
theories that can be used to explain risk disclosures. This can result in a ‘pick ‘n’ mix’ approach by 
academics. Despite this caution, it is widely accepted that a multi-theoretical approach to corporate 
governance is beneficial (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). This paper uses different theories only where they 
add insights at different stages of the research process.  
 
Agency theory is commonly invoked to explain disclosure, suggesting that company managers will 
want to provide explanations to suit themselves but will need to demonstrate to shareholders that 
their corporate governance practices are appropriate. Under signalling theory (Spence, 1973), 
companies recognise that users of financial reports are relatively uninformed (versus managers) 
about their governance practices (see Zhang & Wiersema, 2009; Connolly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 
2011). Thus managers should signal that their own non-compliant practices are of equal value to 
those required by the Code by providing detailed and bespoke explanations. Bhat, Hope, and Kang 
(2006) adopt both agency and signalling explanations concerning the positive relationship found 
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between the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts and corporate governance disclosure/transparency. 
Under agency theory, managers’ reporting incentives influence financial reporting quality, which in 
turn is influenced by governance. The credibility of financial disclosures can be inferred 
from/signalled by governance disclosures. Their results suggest that governance-related disclosure 
plays a bigger role in improving the information environment when financial disclosures are less 
transparent. 
 
Research adopting agency and signalling theory explanations for disclosure tends to measure 
disclosure in a dichotomous manner. Such an approach does not capture the focus of this study – 
the quality of disclosure. For this reason it makes sense to look elsewhere for useful theories. In 
particular, institutional and resource dependency theories offer particular insights to “demonstrate 
how organizational behaviour may vary from passive conformity to active resistance in response to 
institutional pressures...” (Oliver, 1991, p. 146).  
 
Institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999), with its focus on conformity 
which is associated with survival, tends to suggest compliance. First, companies may feel coerced 
into compliance either to follow best practice or they may be reluctant to craft an explanation for 
non-compliance. DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 156) state that “abrupt increases in uncertainty and 
ambiguity (such as when a new Code is introduced) should, after brief periods of... experimentation 
lead to rapid isomorphic change.” This might suggest a long term equilibrium of compliance among 
companies, something which could undermine the ‘comply-or-explain’ philosophy. This would be the 
case if companies felt so pressurised into compliance such that their compliance was more apparent 
than real (Oliver, 1991). Second, companies may copy other companies’ non-compliance (termed 
mimetic behaviour by DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Third, companies may be tempted to mimic or 
copy the actual explanations of others particularly where they are unsure themselves how best to 
craft the explanation. The Code itself provides no guidance which could be interpreted as indirect 
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evidence that it favours compliance. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) state “Uncertainty is... a 
powerful force that encourages imitation” (p. 151). If there are questions about legitimacy regarding 
non-compliance, managers may copy what might be seen as acceptable practices of respected or 
bellwether organisations to “maintain legitimacy and increase survival prospects” (Dillard, Rigsby, & 
Goodman, 2004, p. 510).  
 
Mimetic behaviour is inconsistent with ‘comply-or-explain’ as the act of non-compliance implies the 
company is unlike other ‘typical’ companies. Thus, managers of non-complying companies should 
provide bespoke and specific explanations. Copied disclosures cannot be bespoke. Because the 
circumstances of each company are inevitably different, the explanation is unlikely to be as good as 
a specially crafted one.  
 
Another related aspect of institutional theory is decoupling. Decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Dillard et al., 2004) refers to corporate practices that are inconsistent with organisational processes. 
For example, managers may choose to disclose an explanation from another company’s annual 
report even though that explanation is unrelated to the company’s own circumstances. 
Alternatively, managers may construct an explanation which bears no relation to reality or is just 
partly true. A version of this could also be the circumstance where the company simply fails to give 
an explanation (i.e. is silent on the reason for non-compliance).  
 
Resource dependency theory, which has its origins in the sociological and organisational literature 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989), suggests that companies (or their managers) will maximise the resources 
available to them. Thus, companies will prioritise certain key resources such as banking or legal 
expertise over compliance with the Code such as independence of non-executive directors. Agency 
theory predicts that managers act in a self-serving manner and resource dependency theory predicts 
that “companies will view the function of the non-executive director more in terms of usefulness (to 
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the company) than independence” (as desired by the Code) (Shrives, 2010, pp. 118-119). 
Convergence exists between resource dependency and institutional theory in that both, like agency 
theory, predict self-serving behaviour which seeks legitimacy and stability (Oliver, 1991). For 
resource dependency theory, that manifests itself in non-compliance (in order to secure vital 
resources), while for institutional theory, that normally manifests itself in compliance. Mimetic non-
compliance can also be a predicted outcome of institutional theory.  
 
Non-compliance with the Code should not be seen as a legitimacy issue because it is entirely 
legitimate within the ‘comply-or-explain’ framework to provide an explanation for non-compliance. 
One of the concerns with the operation of the Code, as it now stands, is that interest only in 
compliance or non-compliance (i.e. rather than the explanation) can drive companies towards 
compliance where it is inappropriate (e.g. misaligned with company objectives) or simply false. 
Legitimacy issues would only arise if an explanation was defective or missing, or non-compliance was 
framed as compliance and subsequently detected. 
 
Resource dependency theory helps researchers understand why certain sections of the Code are not 
complied with and may predict where non-compliance is most likely. Institutional theory suggests 
that managers may utilise a number of devices to make the non-compliance less visible particularly 
in companies which have high public visibility. If legitimacy is seen as a ‘resource’ (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983), then resource dependency theory also helps researchers understand the approaches 
companies may take to hide non-compliance.  
 
3. Research methods: Quality Characteristics, Typology and Sample 
A quality typology comprising seven components (see Figure 1) is applied to address the research 
question: what is the quality of corporate governance non-compliance explanations? For ease of 
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exposition of results, sub-questions are identified by reference to the seven elements of our 
typology.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
3.1 Location 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) claim that because investors have limited attention spans, different ways 
of disclosing the same information may impact on perceptions and even market price. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), in its staff reviews of IFRS compliance, also commented that some 
companies scatter disclosure (SEC, 2007) and this can have an impact on understanding. Perceptions 
of firm performance and prospects can be manipulated by the way information is presented in 
corporate documents. Ordering or physical location of information can be used to direct readers’ 
attention to or away from specific items of information (Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983; Baird & 
Zelin, 2000; Bowen, Davis, & Matsumoto, 2005; Elliott, 2006; Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin, & Pierce, 
2009). Companies may take advantage of the lack of rules on location, placing the explanations 
where they are less visible.  
 
In Botosan’s (2004) discussion of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), she was critical of their view of 
quality preferring instead to use the concepts from the IASB’s and Financial Accounting Standards 
Board’s generally accepted conceptual frameworks. Botosan (2004) reminds us that quality can be 
considered a function of understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability. More recently in 
the IASB’s 2010 framework, relevance and reliability were replaced by timeliness and verifiability, 
understandability and comparability remaining. These four are termed ‘enhancing qualitative 
characteristics’ (IASB, 2010, paragraph QC19). Location can help facilitate both understandability 
and comparability. Quick identification of non-compliance can help with understanding the extent to 
which a company complies with the Code. If explanations are less easy to find, understandability 
may be compromised. Similarly comparability is also assisted by location. If all companies disclosed 
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their explanations in a consistent location, comparability would be enhanced. For these reasons, we 
include location as a component of quality (Research Question 1.1).  
 
Location is analysed in five categories: (A) Explanations for non-compliance as part of a corporate 
governance report: (1) At the start; (2) In the middle; (3) At the end; (4) Scattered throughout the 
corporate governance report; (B) No corporate governance report: Explanations for non-compliance 
subsumed within another part of the annual report and may therefore be more difficult to locate. 
 
Investors are likely to prefer a separate corporate governance report (A) to no corporate governance 
report (B). It is debateable the extent different categories are preferred, but arguably either start 
(A(1)) or end (A(3)) are the best locations. Scattered disclosure is likely to be difficult for readers to 
comprehend.  
 
3.2 Comprehensiveness 
Research Question 1.2 examines the extent to which companies provide comprehensive 
explanations of their non-compliance. Comprehensiveness is analysed in five categories: (1) Full 
explanation of non-compliance: Code provision labels (e.g. A.2.1) with customised explanations 
(best); (2) Explanation and Code provision label disclosed but not always together; (3) Explanation 
with no Code provision label; (4) Code provision label with no explanation; (5) Code provision labels 
appear incorrect (worst). 
 
Completeness is consistent with the quality measures discussed by Botosan (2004), facilitating both 
understandability and comparability. If a Code provision label is supplied there can be no doubt as to 
which provision of the Code is being referenced. In its absence, even the most articulate description 
about non-compliance can result in some doubt, particularly when the Code often refers to the same 
issue in a number of provisions. Code provision labels also help with another of IASB’s enhancing 
9 
 
qualitative characteristics – verifiability. However, institutional theory suggests that managers may 
be reluctant to disclose non-compliant Code details as it draws attention to a lack of compliance and 
differentiates the company from compliers  
 
3.3 Mimetic Behaviour 
Non-compliance by its very nature is different from the ‘norm,’ thus the need for a bespoke, 
individually crafted explanation. A copied/boilerplate explanation represents someone else’s 
thinking and may not reflect the individual company circumstances. Thus the disclosure will be 
symbolic rather than substantive (Day & Woodward, 2004). In addition, copied/boilerplate 
explanations may violate the fundamental qualitative characteristics of relevance and faithful 
representation (IASB, 2010). To investigate the extent of copied/boilerplate explanations, one Code 
Provision – A.2.1 – was selected which requires the roles of chair and chief executive not to be 
exercised by the same person (duality). This provision was chosen because it is a key Code 
requirement which researchers have long emphasised as being important (Conyon & Mallin, 1997). 
Too much power concentrated in one person is often cited as a particular weakness leading to 
corporate governance failure and is believed to be one of the factors which led to the events at 
Enron (see, for example, Solomon & Solomon, 2004). 
 
Research Question 1.3 examines the extent to which companies appear to copy other companies’ 
explanations in relation to duality. A three-stage process was devised. First, companies breaching 
Provision A.2.1 were identified. Second, explanations were extracted and read through and 
compared. Any similarities between explanations were noted. Third, explanations in separate files 
were uploaded to the software plagiarism-detection program ‘Turnitin.’ Holder-Webb and Cohen 
(2012) examine ethics codes in US companies using similar software. Matches are displayed and 
colour coded according to the degree of match. Some matches are expected (for example to a 
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company’s own internet site) and these are discarded. No cut off point or percentage of copying is 
suggested as acceptable.  
 
3.4 Length 
Research Question 1.4 examines the length of explanations. In a paper that seeks to make a 
distinction between quality and quantity of disclosure, it may appear somewhat strange that length 
is suggested as a component of quality. First, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) have also claimed that 
quality comprises different components of which one is quantity. Second, the pilot study of the 
explanations of 20 companies preceding this research indicated that explanations for non-
compliance tend to be extremely brief. Other research supports that conclusion (MacNeil & Li, 2006; 
Pass, 2006). Third, directors and managers have an incentive to keep explanations as short as 
possible in order not to draw attention to non-compliance. For this reason, they may not be as 
forthcoming as they otherwise might be. Thus, for this particular area of disclosure, length is to be 
welcomed. Finally, longer explanations require considerable effort to craft and are indicative 
(although not conclusive) of the amount of effort expended by the company or its managers. Thus, 
in this particular context, short explanations are likely, other things being equal, to be of lower 
quality than longer explanations. However, over-long explanations may be viewed as convoluted and 
hence may not be read by users. For this reason, six length categories are adopted: (1) 100-199 
words (this is arguably the ‘best’ category with a full and detailed explanation); (2) In excess of 200 
words (over-long and therefore not ideal); (3) 60-99 words; (4) 30-59 words; (5) 15-29 words (too 
brief); (6) Fewer than 15 words (very brief). The pilot study showed that it was not possible to 
provide an explanation adequately describing the circumstances of non-compliance in fewer than 30 
words. We acknowledge that the choice of these length categories is somewhat arbitrary and our 
interpretation of them is somewhat subjective. 
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3.5 Complexity 
If disclosures are unclear or complex then understandability is likely to be compromised (Rutherford, 
2003). The wording of the Code is often quite ambiguous. It can be difficult to resolve whether a 
company is describing compliance or explaining non-compliance. This sort of concealment (Oliver, 
1991) is also predicted by institutional theory. Company managers may feel it is in their interest to 
be opaque. Understandability is an enhancing qualitative characteristic of the IASB conceptual 
framework (IASB, 2010). Lang and Lundholm (1993) state that clarity of writing could be seen as a 
component of quality. For the purposes of Research Question 1.5, complexity is divided into two 
sub-components: (1) readability and (2) use of the passive voice (‘passivity’).  
 
 The majority of readability studies use the Flesch scores (13 out of 15 studies examined in Brennan 
et al., 2009, pp. 792-793). This demonstrates that, while the Flesch index should be used with 
caution, it can be helpful as part of an overall quality measure. By way of comparison, Courtis (2004) 
found scores in Hong Kong annual reports to be around the mid-30s (difficult to read).  
 
The use of the passive voice as an element of complexity is particularly relevant to company 
explanations for non-compliance because it enables the writer to be separated from the message 
(Thomas, 1997). By separating the subject(s) from the verb, the passive voice can make the 
explanation seem more objective. Put simply, the directors or managers may be more likely to write 
“The Code has not been complied with in the following respects…” rather than “The directors decided 
not to comply with the following Code provisions.” This illustrates the danger that the non-
compliance is attributed to no-one in particular and thus readers are unlikely to know anything 
about the processes which led to the non-compliance. One of the advantages with passivity is that it 
can be electronically calculated at the same time as a word count. However, it is necessary to 
perform checks and recalculate passivity as the software is not always totally consistent.  
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 3.6 Specificity 
 A number of authors also emphasise the need for specificity and incorporate it in their assessment 
of disclosure (Sydserff & Weetman 1999; Warsame, Neu, & Simmons, 2002; Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004). Day and Woodward (2004) distinguish between substantive and symbolic disclosure, finding 
the majority to be merely symbolic. Akkermans et al. (2007, p. 1113) report that many companies 
only provide “generally applicable arguments.” In contrast, Sheath and Land (2006, p. 4) state that 
“Investors want a company to use its report to reflect its specific approach to governance.” An 
explanation which is of equal value to compliance has to be bespoke and specific. Research Question 
1.6 examines the specificity of explanations by reference to three categories: (1) Specific 
explanation: One which provides details of the non-compliance, giving reasons for it which are 
relevant to a particular company’s special circumstances, for example, referring to directors’ names, 
the number of years of service. A specific explanation is best because it is most closely tailored to 
the company; (2) General explanation: One which could apply to a number of companies and does 
not attempt to address the specific circumstances relevant to the company in question. This type of 
explanation is likely to be more symbolic than substantive (Day & Woodward, 2004); (3) Inadequate 
explanation: One where the part of the Code not complied with is identified but does not detail 
exactly why the non-compliance occurred. Explanations which are missing are also coded to the 
category. Company managers who are trying to conceal non-compliance are more likely to provide 
no explanation or provide a general explanation in line with institutional theory (Oliver, 1991). 
Specificity is an important component of quality, is indirectly relevant to comparability and is also 
related to comprehensiveness. 
 
3.7 Attestation 
Hammond and Miles (2004) surveyed executives and found that “Verification was generally 
considered as a stamp of quality” (p. 69). The IASB lists verifiability as an enhancing characteristic. 
This suggests that attestation can improve the quality of corporate governance statements. If any of 
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the nine provisions on which auditors have to report are not adequately disclosed, auditors are 
required to include an ‘emphasis-of-matter’ paragraph in their audit report. Although there is no 
strict requirement for auditors to audit corporate governance disclosures, guidance on the review 
work required is issued by the UK Auditing Practices Board (APB, 2004). In the pilot study of 20 
companies, all the audit firms used the suggested form of words in the APB bulletin: 
We review whether the Corporate Governance Statement reflects the company’s 
compliance with the nine provisions of the 2003 FRC Code specified for our review by 
the Listing Rules of the Financial Services Authority, and we report if it does not. We are 
not required to…form an opinion on the effectiveness of the [company’s] [group’s] 
corporate governance procedures… (APB, 2004, Appendix 2). 
 
Research Question 1.7 examines the extent to which auditors either (i) issue a fully clean report or 
(ii) include an emphasis-of-matter paragraph. Institutional theory would suggest that auditors are 
likely to engage in standard ritualistic behaviour so it would seem unlikely that they would use an 
emphasis-of-matter paragraph in expressing concerns about non-compliance or explanations. Thus, 
the most likely outcome is an unmodified audit report regardless of non-compliance.  
 
3.8 Sample 
Explanations were analysed for two periods: (1) the first year of compliance with the Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2003) when it was substantially changed in 2003 was examined. The 2003 
changes were some of the most significant and therefore would provide a variety of explanations to 
test the quality typology. (2) For comparative purposes, the 2010 version of the Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010) was also examined. Comparisons are also made between the FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 sectors. Results are based on three levels of analysis: (i) Companies, (ii) Code breaches and 
(iii) Explanations for non-compliance. Code breaches and explanations for non-compliance were 
obtained from annual reports. All companies that claimed compliance with the Code were excluded 
from the sample, as were investment trusts. The sample is shown in Table 2. Code breaches and 
explanations were identified by searching for the words ‘compliance,’ ‘non-compliance,’ ‘Combined 
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Code,’ ‘Code,’ or ‘corporate governance’ within annual reports until the relevant section was found 
and then repeatedly until the researcher was sure all relevant items were located.  
< Insert Table 2 here> 
 
4. Results 
As shown in Table 2, during 2004/5 (the first year of compliance with the 2003 Code), 75% of FTSE 
350 companies did not comply with at least one Code provision. This contrasts with 2011/12 (the 
first year of compliance with the 2010 Code) where the equivalent figure is 47%. In 2004/5, 67% of 
FTSE 100 companies did not comply with at least one item of Code compared with 79% of FTSE 250 
companies which is a significant difference at the 5% level (p = 0.03). By 2010/11, non-compliance 
had fallen to 45% and 47% respectively (with no significant difference). The average number of non-
compliances fell from 2.63 to 2.02 across the FTSE 350 (see Table 3). Using chi-square1 tests, 
significant differences appear between compliance with the 2003 and 2010 Codes for FTSE 350 (1% 
level), FSE 250 (10% level) and FTSE 100 companies (5% level). This suggests that companies are 
being encouraged to comply, although it is not totally clear where that pressure is coming from. This 
would fit with the behaviour described by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in that, after a brief period of 
experimentation (non-compliance), companies rapidly fall into compliance (or maybe merely claim 
to do so). There is a danger companies may comply in a box-ticking/boilerplate manner as the 
simplest way of avoiding the need to craft explanations and face increased scrutiny. A wholesale 
move towards compliance may mean that companies are reluctant not to comply even where they 
feel justified in not complying. It may well be that companies view the ‘explain’ option as having 
been constructively removed because they perceive that the UK context does not consider it to be a 
legitimate action, notwithstanding it being an acceptable course of action under the Code. If 
compliance were to become the norm, companies may even feel that the option of non-compliance 
ceases to exist. Claiming compliance when the company has not complied is a particularly 
unsatisfactory outcome. In short, non-compliance should be welcomed where company directors 
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have made a clear and conscious decision and it should only be questioned where the explanation is 
of low quality. Discussion of the quality components of explanations can help to highlight good 
disclosure practice. 
< Insert Table 3 here> 
 
The most common Code breaches are summarised in Table 4. Although there are some differences 
between FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies and over time, the rankings are quite similar. Thus while 
Table 3 has shown the total non-compliance picture has changed, the proportions of what is not 
being complied with are quite similar. The key areas of non-compliance represent the proportion of 
the board comprising independent non-executives, followed by the constitution of the various board 
committees. It is surprising how many large companies do not comply with what are arguably key 
aspects of corporate governance. It may be that mimetic behaviour can explain this unexpected level 
of non-compliance. It is reasonable to suggest that managers of companies may feel that as other 
large companies do not comply, then there are fewer pressures on them to do so. Thus, there may 
be factors related to institutional theory at work here. In comparison, resource dependency theory 
would also suggest that once companies feel confident with non-executives, they wish to retain 
them and benefit from the expertise they have developed. Thus, companies and their managers may 
be willing to breach the Code (in particular the rules on independence and the related committees) 
in order to keep those resources (people) who are most useful to them. Thus, resource dependency 
theory can explain the lack of compliance in these key areas. 
< Insert Table 4 here> 
 
The next sections examine the seven components of quality disclosures in turn. 
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4.1 Location 
The majority (54% for 2004/5 and 63% for 2011/12) of FTSE 350 companies opted for the optimal 
location for explanations, i.e. the start of the corporate governance report. The end of the report 
was selected by 19% of companies (or 15% in the most recent iteration of the Code – see Table 5). 
Thus, considering both time frames, 70-80% of companies selected what might be seen as a good 
location for their explanations. For the remaining companies (20-30% depending on time frame), 
some had no corporate governance report (8% or 3%), while others disclosed the information in the 
middle of the report (9% or 11%) or worse adopted a scattered approach to disclosure (10% or 8%). 
Further research is needed to ascertain why companies (or their managers) choose to disclose in this 
particular way. There is no significant difference between FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies (using 
chi square tests p > 0.10 for both years). The need to conceal or hide non-compliance appears 
consistent with both resource dependency theory and institutional theory.  
< Insert Table 5 here> 
 
4.2 Comprehensiveness 
Table 6 shows that for the 2003 Code fewer than 40% of companies provided comprehensive 
disclosures, with 60% producing information which is inadequate in varying degrees. For the 
disclosure in 2011/12 (the 2010 Code), the position has improved significantly (using chi-square tests 
at the 5% level for both sectors and at the 1% level overall) for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies 
with around 60% providing the ‘best’ disclosure. However, despite that improvement, 40% of 
companies still do not provide the Code provisions (e.g. A.2.1) – something that might be seen as 
basic information. Disguising non-conformity would again be consistent with institutional and 
resource dependency theories (Oliver, 1991). By appearing to be more akin to a complying company, 
managers may feel organisational legitimacy is enhanced (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Although 
company managers may feel that their legitimacy is improved by hiding information, it is likely to 
lead to confusion on the part of readers (which may be the manager’s intention). It would be helpful 
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if the FRC introduced guidance on comprehensiveness in ensuring that disclosures were fully 
comparable and thus were consistent with IASB’s enhancing qualitative characteristics. This would 
still give companies flexibility as to the specific content of their explanations and thus be consistent 
with the flexibility offered by the ‘comply-or-explain’ system.  
< Insert Table 6 here> 
 
4.3 Mimetic Behaviour 
This part of the study examined one section of the Code (A.2.1) to see the extent companies used 
the same explanation. Thirty two companies within the sample provided single provision (i.e. not 
combined with another Code provision) explanations for violation of the Code concerning duality. 
The anti-plagiarism software, ‘Turnitin,’ found matches (which are not mutually exclusive): 
 To the company’s own accounts for either the year in question or for subsequent years. For over 
two thirds of companies (as expected) there was a 100% match.  
 To 11 explanations which partly matched the wording of comment in either academic journals (in 
the areas of accounting, management or linguistics) or to professional papers (such as Pensions 
Week) or to circulars or other internet sources. Just over a third of explanations matched student 
essays from various UK universities (including Warwick, Leeds, Bradford and Edinburgh) 
suggesting that students had referred to explanations relating to this Code item as part of their 
assignments. 
 To 12 company explanations which partly matched other companies’ explanations in the UK and 
overseas. These were found to be matched with the Code itself rather than to other companies’ 
specific explanations. Unsurprisingly, companies tend to use similar words to the Code when 
describing how the provision should be complied with rather than the ‘pure’ explanation part for 
non-compliance. 
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One company’s explanation matched directly to an FRC report (FRC, 2012c). Similar to this study, the 
FRC also examined Code provision A.2.1. The FRC admitted the standard of explanations was 
variable (p.16). It was disappointing to see the FRC describing what we believe to be a limited and 
general explanation as “succinct” (p.18). It is difficult to conclude from these limited results. More 
work is needed to establish the extent to which companies either copy from the Code (some 
evidence here) or from each other. There is also some evidence that companies maintain the same 
explanation from year to year, which does not necessarily indicate a problem but may be worthy of 
further investigation.  
 
4.4 Length 
There is no ideal length for an explanation. The average length in 2004/5 was 74 words and this 
increased to 87 words in 2011/12 (see Table 7). For the FTSE 100, the average length has increased 
from 80 to 97 words (not quite significant using a t-test, p = 0.119) and for the FTSE 250 it has 
increased from 71 to 83 words (significant at the 5% level, p = 0.027). This suggests companies are 
providing more detailed explanations or, at the very least, explanations made up of more words. 
This is consistent with institutional theory in that managers are encouraged to produce more 
detailed explanations. A key concern which still remains is that 14% in 2004/5 and 12% in 2011/12 of 
FTSE 350 companies provided explanations of fewer than 30 words which is unlikely to be adequate 
to provide enough detail if users are going to understand both the nature of and reasons for non-
compliance. It may be that by providing fewer words managers feel that they can disguise or avoid 
drawing attention to non-conformity something which is again consistent with both resource 
dependency and institutional theories (Oliver, 1991). Although excessive length (> 200 words) was 
identified as a possible problem, it only applied to 3-4% of disclosures. 
< Insert Table 7 here>  
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4.5 Complexity 
Complexity of language is measured in two ways: Flesch scores and passivity. Previous research has 
suggested that financial statements are complex to read so it is no surprise to find that explanations 
for non-compliance are particularly so. Flesch scores indicate (Table 8) that for the most part 
explanations are very difficult to read with very few explanations (1% or 2%) fitting the fairly difficult 
category in either time period. The scores do not differ significantly between the two periods or the 
two FTSE sectors. This suggests that Flesch scores are not improving and readability remains a 
concern with nearly all explanations being difficult or very difficult to read. Of course it may relate to 
the nature of explanations and the wording used in the Code.  
 
For FTSE 100 companies, the mean passivity scores (Table 9) have fallen from 31% in 2004/5 to 19% 
in 2011/12 (which is significant at the 1% level, p = 0.007). Interestingly for FTSE 250 companies, the 
average scores have risen from 27% to 31% but not significantly so (p > 0.1). Thus, while 2004/5 
scores were not significantly different between FTSE sectors, in 2011/12 they were significantly 
different (p = 0.004). This would suggest that FTSE 100 companies are taking greater care over their 
explanations and using the passive voice less, which improvement has yet to impact on FTSE 250 
companies who are not so visible (see explanation for specificity below). 
< Insert Table 8 here> 
< Insert Table 9 here> 
 
4.6 Specificity 
The picture on specificity is complex and differs between FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies. Taken 
as a whole (FTSE 350), many companies do not provide specific explanations (55% in 2004/5 and 
60% in 2011/12) (Table 10). A quarter of companies provided a general explanation in 2004/5 but 
this increased to a third in 2011/12. FTSE 100 companies provided more specific explanations and 
were not significantly different when comparing the two periods. However, FTSE 250 companies 
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provided fewer specific explanations between the two time periods (significant at the 1% level using 
a chi-square test). As FTSE 100 companies have improved, and FTSE 250 appear to have got worse, it 
is not surprising that in 2011/12 there was a significant difference between FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
companies (at the 5% level). FTSE 100 companies are perhaps more in the ‘limelight’ and their 
managers may have been persuaded to make more effort (following institutional theory) to improve 
disclosures.  
 
For both FTSE sectors, the percentage of no or inadequate explanations was still around a quarter. A 
typical but sub-optimal approach taken by some companies is where non-compliance is fixed by the 
end of the year but no explanation is provided. Companies (or their managers) who have fixed their 
non-compliance by the end of the year may wish to be viewed from an institutional theory 
perspective as part of the ‘compliers’ rather than ‘non-compliers’ group. Since the Code applies for 
the whole year, this is misleading. Readers are entitled to a full explanation as to why non-
compliance occurred in the first instance. 
< Insert Table 10 here> 
 
4.7 Attestation 
In the study, as expected from a consideration of institutional theory, no auditors of the companies 
examined raised any issues in relation to company compliance for the periods examined. Auditors 
are only required to review compliance with nine provisions. One of these provisions (C.3.1 – audit 
committee constitution) was the second most commonly breached, with 81 and 34 incidences in 
2004/05 and 2011/12 respectively. Auditors are not expected to review the explanations, just the 
disclosure of non-compliance. As might be expected, all auditors used limited but almost identical 
wording in their reports when referring to corporate governance compliance based on the APB 
bulletin recommendations. The only exceptions to this were mistakes that some auditors appeared 
to make. Some mistakes were trivial (e.g. minor errors or omissions in reports) but the majority of 
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these mistakes (in 2004/5 this related to six companies) involved referring to the seven provisions on 
which auditors were required to comment in the audit report under the previous 1998 version of the 
Code, as opposed to nine which is the number under more the recent 2003 to 2010 versions. In one 
of these cases, the company also made a mistake in its governance report by referring to provision 
D.3.1 which relates to the previous version of the Code. This provision was replaced by C.3.1 and 
C.3.2 which auditors are required to review under the APB bulletin and hence should have been 
correctly identified by the auditor. In the 2011/12 corporate governance reports, there were fewer 
mistakes (for example one FTSE 250 company referred to the wrong Code) but there were still five 
incidences where auditors wrongly referred to the 2008 Code in their report. At times, it seems as if 
both auditor and company were still working from the previous Code.  
 
It appears that auditors are reluctant to question either compliance under the Code or the adequacy 
of explanations. In one sense this is perfectly understandable. In another sense it is quite 
disappointing that, despite the poor quality of the disclosure, auditors chose not to intervene. 
Auditor silence may illustrate the provision of standard advice by mainly Big 4 auditors and this is 
another example of isomorphism and institutional theory in practice (Oliver, 1991). The review 
carried out by auditors seems solely to be a symbolic ceremonial exercise with seemingly little value 
(Carruthers, 1995; Fogarty & Rogers, 2005). No ‘emphasis-of-matter’ paragraphs were found in audit 
reports. Instead, the standard isomorphic wording dominates.  
 
5. Discussion and Policy Implications 
Applying the quality typology in this study has shown that there have been some serious quality 
issues with explanations for non-compliance which remain unresolved. If self-regulation is to 
operate effectively then companies need to work towards providing detailed and bespoke 
explanations for non-compliance. Although some improvements have been identified over time, it is 
worth considering why managers of companies are continuing to provide poor explanations. One 
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reason is possibly because they believe that regulators, investors and other parties are looking for 
compliance and are thus not interested in explanations. Because of the term ‘comply-or-explain,’ 
explanations may not be seen as part of compliance. Thus, although explanations are an integral 
part of the ‘system,’ they may be seen as second to compliance. This is problematic because a key 
aspect of corporate governance is flexibility with the fundamental idea that one approach to 
governance is not necessarily suitable for all companies at all times.  
 
We applied two theoretical perspectives in the research, finding support for both. Institutional 
theory supports the bandwagon or mimetic effect found where companies see others as not 
complying and/or not giving a high quality explanation seemingly with no consequences and then 
choose to do the same. This would also fit in with companies wishing to retain existing non-
executive directors. Resource dependency theory indicates that the value of non-executive directors 
may not be in terms of Code compliance but rather in terms of providing useful services to the board 
and company. These findings would suggest that the mainly agency theory focus of prior research 
provides an incomplete explanation for non-compliance explanations. 
 
Our study extends prior research by analysing the quality of non-compliance explanations with 
greater depth beyond the two- and three-category scoring systems applied heretofore (see Table 1). 
Our research complements Seidl et al.’s (2013) more detailed 12-category empirically generated 
approach based on the discursive legitimacy tactics employed in explanations, by demonstrating that 
institutional theory and resource dependency theory also explain practice. We would argue that 
non-compliance is not a legitimacy issue because it is entirely legitimate within the ‘comply-or-
explain’ framework to explain non-compliance.  
 
Out of over a hundred responses to the FRC’s (2009) ‘Call for Evidence,’ 16 (approximately 15%) 
explicitly referred to issues concerning explanation quality. More recently, the FRC (2012a) published 
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a report on explanations for non-compliance following two private discussion meetings with senior 
investors and companies. Relevant points about quality in the FRC (2012a) report include: 
(1)  Explanations should be substantive, pointing out that a “substantial minority are not” (FRC, 
2012a, p.4).  
(2)  The FRC rejects the idea that regulators should be responsible for checking explanations, 
preferring instead to rely on shareholders.  
(3)  The EU Green Paper on Corporate Governance (European Commission, 2011) refers to the 
Swedish Code which requires (in respect of non-compliance) disclosure of: (i) the Code rules not 
complied with, (ii) the reasons for each case of non-compliance and (iii) the solution adopted 
instead. The EU questions whether this three-point approach could be a model for the EU as a 
whole. The FRC maintains that “Arguably, however, the UK Code already goes further than 
this...” (FRC, 2012a, p.3). Based on our research, the FRC’s response seems questionable. UK 
companies often only provide one of these three items (the Code rules not complied with), 
often explanations are perfunctory, and they rarely discuss the solution they have adopted 
instead.  
(4)  A useful part of the FRC (2012a) Report discusses the elements of a meaningful explanation. 
These comprised context and background, a rationale for the action taken and mitigating action 
as a result of any additional risk and whether the deviation was limited in time and when the 
company intended to return to conformity. The FRC’s use of the word ‘when’ seems surprising. 
Non-compliance does not have to lead to compliance if the reason for it is justifiable and 
unlikely to change. Participants (speaking at the FRC’s 2012 meeting) said explanations should 
be “relevant, specific and sufficiently informative” (FRC, 2012a, p. 6) which is consistent with the 
recommendations in our paper. Another participant raised the idea that an explanation should 
not require any follow-up action. Again this is consistent with the idea of a fulsome, complete 
and bespoke explanation. 
24 
 
(5)  Some of the points in the FRC (2012a) Report appear anecdotal and readers are left to wonder 
whether the FRC uses them to confirm its particular worldview. For example, a corporate 
participant is quoted as saying “there were few blatant abusers and explanations had been 
improving in recent years” (p. 7). This sort of comment does not sit well with the evidence and 
one wonders on what it is based. It is hard to disagree with many of the points made by the FRC 
including the benefits of ‘comply-or-explain’ when used properly. The only issue is: to what 
extent is it ‘used properly’? If it is not used properly then, as one of the respondents to the 
FRC’s 2009 Call claims, “... it is a dangerous charade” (Boatman, 2009, p. 1).  
 
A key issue is whether the Code can be improved to make it work better. The first step in that 
evolution is realising that it needs to work better, if it is to work at all. A move towards compliance 
as the only outcome will result in other problems and cannot be seen as a solution when flexibility is 
seen as essential. More direction is likely to help. It could be as simple as requiring companies which 
do not comply to, say, construct a table listing in columns: 
 The provision not complied with (e.g. A.3.1). 
 A brief summary of that provision. 
 A detailed, but clearly written explanation which is bespoke to the company stating the reason 
for non-compliance.  
 How the approach taken still ensures good governance. 
 An indication as to whether or not it is intended that the section would be complied with at some 
time in the future. 
 
The table would be disclosed at the start of the corporate governance report or, failing that, in a 
prominent position with a cross-reference in the annual report or website contents. By adopting a 
tabular approach, readability and comprehensiveness could be overcome as would the problem with 
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location because tables are visible and quickly identified in comparison to text. A tabular approach 
would also solve specificity problems because it would force companies to provide an explanation.  
 
It does not seem unreasonable to ask for some sort of basic review of explanations by either the 
auditors or the FRC. This would not have to be too onerous (perhaps just ensuring that all suggested 
components identified above were present). Companies would then be aware that some checks are 
being undertaken. The purpose of this would be to improve the quality of disclosure without being 
overly prescriptive and continue to allow a high degree of flexibility which is within the spirit of the 
UK Corporate Governance Code.  
 
As a result of the findings of the initial stages of this research, five recommendations were made in 
response to the FRC’s (2009) Call for Evidence: 
 Recommendation 1 – Positioning of compliance statements: Compliance 
statements should be clearly identifiable; ideally, located at the start of the 
Corporate Governance report listing any non-compliant items.  
 Recommendation 2 – Details provided in compliance statements: Compliance 
statements should contain details of non-compliance, the relevant Code provision 
together with an explanation. 
 Recommendation 3 – Length and readability of explanations: Explanations should 
be adequately detailed so that shareholders can make proper judgements as to 
their appropriateness. They should be written in simple language to make it easy 
to understand the reasons for non-compliance. They should also avoid the use of 
manipulative language designed to underplay non-compliance. 
 Recommendation 4 – Specificity of explanations: Explanations should be specific 
ensuring that the reasons for non-compliance are pertinent and adequate. 
 Recommendation 5 – Review of compliance statements and explanations: The 
FRC should consider the need to instigate some sort of oversight for ‘comply-or-
explain’ disclosures. We believe that some kind of supervised self-regulation is 
likely to lead to higher quality compliance statements and explanations for non-
compliance. 
 
Recently the 2012 Code has been issued (FRC, 2012b) with small amendments pertaining to the 
detail of explanations compared with the previous Code (FRC, 2010). This is a step in the right 
direction but it will be interesting to examine the extent to which managers take note of these 
changes.  
26 
 
6. Limitations, Further Research and Conclusions 
This research has examined explanations for non-compliance using a quality typology. We find that 
while compliance levels improved from 2004/05 to 2011/12, the areas of non-compliance remain 
proportionately similar, with some key provisions of the Code not being complied with. Although the 
quality dimensions suggested here are subjective, context specific and may be incomplete, they 
reflect the prior literature and form a basis for future discussion and work. Our working typology and 
theoretical framework provides a base upon which others can apply a consistent qualitative 
assessment of corporate governance non-compliance explanations over time. The typology may also 
be of use to other researchers working in the wider area of voluntary disclosure. Our quality 
typology can be adapted to other areas of narrative reporting such as environmental or risk 
reporting. Quality is likely to be context specific so the components can be adapted in order to 
measure different aspects of reporting and how that reporting changes over time.2  
  
Quality of reporting is difficult to determine but that does not undermine its importance. An 
examination of comments relating to the FRC’s report on ‘cutting clutter’ (FRC, 2011) suggests that 
without doubt the majority of stakeholders would prefer to see the quality of reporting improved 
rather than the quantity of reporting increasing (Linsley & Shrives, in press). Similarly, Sheath and 
Land (2006) also emphasise that investors unanimously want, inter alia, fewer boilerplate 
disclosures and a focus on quality of reporting (see also Solomon, 2010).  
 
This paper has made suggestions as to how corporate governance reports can be improved 
specifically with reference to explanations for non-compliance. A move towards compliance may be 
seen as a solution by some. However, further research is needed to establish whether companies 
claiming compliance are actually doing so because theory suggests that managers have both 
incentives and means to hide non-compliance (Oliver, 1991). To encourage a move towards 
compliance simply because it solves the problem of badly crafted explanations is likely to result in 
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unforeseen consequences and may permanently damage the system of which the UK is seemingly 
proud and which the rest of the world is keen to emulate.  
 
Notes 
1. Chi-square tests were used where results were categorical (e.g. specificity). Where results were 
numerical (or scale) then t-tests were used instead. Significance was measured in the normal way. 
2. A longitudinal study which examines company characteristics (e.g. measures of size) and quality of 
disclosure would be a subject for further research. That approach would complement existing 
studies which have confirmed a relationship between quantity of disclosure and size. The authors 
are most grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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Table 1 
Prior empirical research on comply-or-explain corporate governance disclosures. 
Paper Theory Data Non-compliance disclosure measure Conclusion 
MacNeil and Li (2006) Agency theory 18 FTSE 100 serial 
non-compliers in 2004 
Analysis of non-compliance explanations 
not systematic 
Investors evaluate non-compliance by 
reference to a proxy in the form of share 
price performance. 
Pass (2006) Agency theory 70 non-compliance 
explanations of 50 
FTSE 250 companies in 
2005 
Acceptable/unacceptable explanations There were 11 companies in breach of 
the Code not providing acceptable 
explanations. 
Andres and Theissen (2008) Agency theory (implicit): 
managers may wish to 
escape stringent 
monitoring 
150 German listed 
firms 2002-2003 
Disclosure/non-disclosure of executive 
compensation by individual executive 
Firms that paid higher than average 
remuneration to executive directors 
were less likely to comply with comply-
or-explain executive compensation 
disclosure requirements. 
Arcot, Bruno, and Faure-
Grimaud (2010) 
None explicitly identified  Longitudinal study of 
1,286 FTSE 350 firm 
years 1998-2004, with 
1,576 instances of 
non-compliance 
(i) No explanation; (ii) General 
explanation; (iii) Specific explanation 
Frequent use of standard rather than 
specific explanations found. A large 
number of companies provide no 
explanation for non-compliance. 
Hooghiemstra (2012) Agency theory Longitudinal study of 
331 firm-year 
observations of Dutch 
listed firms 2005-2009 
Score based on (i) No explanation (1 
point); (ii) Generic explanation (2 
points); (iii) Firm-specific explanation (4 
points) 
Firms with weaker boards, followed by 
fewer analysts, with more dispersed 
ownership, with greater leverage 
provide less-informative explanations. 
Seidl, Sanderson, and 
Roberts (2013) 
Legitimacy theory 715 non-compliance 
explanations of 
German and UK firms 
published in 2006  
1. Deficient (three categories), 2. 
Context-specific (six categories), 3. 
Principled justifications (three 
categories) 
Analysis of different discursive legitimacy 
tactics deployed help to understand the 
role of comply-or-explain in corporate 
governance regimes. 
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Table 2 
Population and sample. 
 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 (i.e. next 250) FTSE 350 
 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Panel A: Unit of analysis: Companies 
FTSE companies 100  100  250  250  350  350  
Less Excluded from sample a(5)  a (5)  b(72)  b (76)  (77)  (81)  
Total sample  95  100% 95 100% 178 100% 174 100% 273 100% 269 100% 
Less Claim full compliance (31) (33%) (52)  (55%) (37) (21%) (91) (53%) (68) (25%) (143) (53%) 
Less Provide ambiguous 
disclosures 
(1)  (0%) (0) (0%) (0) (0%) (1) (0%)  (1) (0%) (1)  (0%) 
Companies disclosing non-
compliance 
63  67% 43  45% 141  79% 82  47% 204 75% 125 47% 
Panel B: Unit of analysis: Explanations 
Total explanations of non-
complianc c 
146  100% 71  100% 292  100% 137  100% 438  100% 208  100% 
Average per non-compliant 
company 
2.32  1.65  2.07  1.67  2.15   1.66  
Notes:  
a Either taken over or overseas companies following other Codes. 
b The majority of these (in both years) were investment trusts. A small number were taken over by other companies 
or de-listed before the relevant annual reports were produced, or identified themselves as being smaller 
companies. 
C This is not the same as the number of Code items breached (as shown in Table 4) because some Code items are 
combined into one explanation. 
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Table 3 
Extent of non-compliance. 
No.  
Items non- 
compliance 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
2003 Code 
Companies 
2010 Code 
Companies 
2003 Code 
Companies 
2010 Code 
Companies 
2003 Code 
Companies 
2010 Code 
Companies 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1 21  33% 25  58% 47  33% 41  50% 68  33% 66  53% 
2 16  25% 10  23% 36  25% 22  27% 52  26% 32  26% 
3 15  24% 2  5% 25 18% 8 10% 40 20% 10 8% 
4 6  10% 4 9% 17  12%  4 5% 23 11% 8  6% 
5 0  0% 2  5% 8  6% 2 2% 8 4% 4  3% 
6 or more 5 8% 0  0% 8  6% 5 6% 13 6% 5  4% 
Total  63  100%  43  100% 141  100% 82  100% 204  100% 125  100% 
Average no. of 
Code breaches  
2.67  1.80  2.62  2.15  2.63  2.02  
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Table 4  
Code breaches by FTSE 350 companies (ordered by 2003 Code FTSE 350 Total). 
Code area 2003 
Code 
2010 
Code 
2003 Code result 2010 Code result 
FTSE 
100 
% 
FTSE 
250 
% 
FTSE 
350 
% 
FTSE 
100 
% 
FTSE 
250 
% 
FTSE 
350 
% 
Percentage of the board being NEDs  A.3.2 B.1.2 23 14% 78 21% 101 19% 14 18% 35 20% 49 19% 
Audit committee constitution C.3.1 C.3.1 30 18% 51 14% 81 15% 10 13% 24 14% 34 13% 
Remuneration committee  B.2.1 D.2.1 22 13% 57 15% 79 15% 12 16% 17 10% 29 12% 
Nomination committee constitution A.4.1 B.2.1 14 8% 29 8% 43 8% 4 5% 13 7% 17 7% 
Performance evaluation of board A.6.1 B.6.1 8 5% 25 7% 33 6% 1 1% 3 2% 4 2% 
Service contract notice periods B.1.6 D.1.5 7 4% 19 5% 26 5% 1 1% 5 3% 6 2% 
Duality principle  A.2.1 A.2.1 9 5% 13 4% 22 4% 3 4% 12 7% 15 6% 
Meetings with shareholders D.1.1 E.1.1 7 4% 14 4% 21 4% 2 3% 4 2% 6 2% 
Independence of non-executive directors A.3.1 B.1.1 7 4% 13 4% 20 4% 1 1% 6 3% 7 3% 
Appointment criteria for chair A.2.2 A.3.1 4 2% 14 4% 18 3% 5 7% 13 7% 18 7% 
Rules re senior independent director A.3.3 A.4.1 6 4% 12 3% 18 3% 5 7% 3 2% 8 3% 
Performance-related remuneration B.1.1 D.1.1 5 3% 9 2% 14 3% 1 1% 6 3% 7 3% 
Chair meeting with non-executive directors A.1.3 A.4.2 3 2% 8 2% 11 2% 1 1% 2 1% 3 1% 
New: Annual election of directors  N/A B.7.1       2 3% 11 6% 13 5% 
Other categories Various sections 23 14% 27 7% 50 9% 15 19% 22 13% 37 15% 
Total 168 100% 369 100% 537 100% 77 100% 176 100% 253 100% 
NEDs: Non-executive directors 
N/A: Not applicable 
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Table 5  
Quality criterion 1: Location by companies of their explanations of non-compliance (RQ 1.1). 
 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
Location 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 
 No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % No.  % 
Separate corporate governance 
report (explanation at the start) 
27  43% 24 56% 83  59% 55  67% 110  54% 79  63% 
Separate corporate governance 
report (explanation at the end) 
13  20% 7 16% 25 18% 12 15% 38 19% 19  15% 
Separate corporate governance 
report (explanation in the middle) 
9  14% 9 21% 9  6% 4 5% 18 9% 13 11% 
No separate report e.g. 
explanations in directors’ report 
8  13% 1 2% 9  6% 3 3% 17 8% 4 3% 
Scattered approach to disclosure 
of explanations within any report 
6  10% 2 5% 15 11% 8 10% 21 10% 10 8% 
Total number of companies 
providing explanations 
63  100% 43  100% 141  100% 82  100% 204  100% 125  100% 
 
Table 6 
Quality criterion 2: Comprehensiveness by companies of their explanations of non-compliance (RQ 1.2). 
 
Level of Comprehensiveness 
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Provision labels (e.g. A.2.1) 
with description of non-
compliance 
21  33% 26  61% 53 38% 47 57% 74 36% 73 58% 
Labels and description of non-
compliance but not always 
together  
4  6% 1 2% 4  3% 4 5% 8 4% 5 4% 
Description of non-compliance 
without any labels 
37  59% 16 37% 81 57% 31  38% 118  58% 47 38% 
Only Code labels provided 0  0% 0 0% 0  0% 0  0% 0  0% 0  0% 
Labels appear incorrect 1  2% 0  0% 3 2% 0 0% 4 2% 0  0% 
Total number of companies 
examined  
63  100% 43 100% 141 100% 82 100% 204 100% 125 100% 
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Table 7 
Quality criterion 4: Length of explanations* for non-compliance (RQ 1.4). 
Length in words  FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
2003 code 2010 code 2003 code 2010 code 2003 code 2010 code 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
200 or more words 8  5% 4  5% 10 3% 7 4% 18 3% 11  4% 
100 to 199 words 35  21% 22 29% 59 17% 42 24% 94 18% 64 25% 
60 to 99 words 54 32% 25 32% 106  30% 45 26% 160 31% 70 28% 
30 to 59 words 43 26% 22 29% 132 37% 55 32% 175 34% 77 31% 
15 to 29 words 23 14% 3 4% 44 12% 25 14% 67 13% 28 11% 
Fewer than 15 words 3 2% 1 1% 4 1% 1 0% 7 1% 2 1% 
Total number of 
explanations  
including combinations**  
166  100% 77 100% 355 100% 175 100% 521  100% 252 100% 
Mean length (words) 80  97   71  83   74  87  
Maximum length (words) 519  661  345  587  519  661  
Minimum length (words) 13  12  8  12  8  12  
Notes:  
* Unit of analysis: explanations adjusted for number of Code breaches. 
** Some explanations are combined and relate to more than one Code breach. For this reason, the number 
of explanations in Table 2 does not agree with the totals in this table. In addition, there are minor 
discrepancies between the total number of Code breaches in Table 4 and the total number of explanations 
in this table. Where explanations are combined, the length is divided by the number of breaches. 
 
 
Table 8 
Quality criterion 5: Complexity of language 1 – Flesch scores measuring readability of explanations (RQ 1.5). 
  FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
Score  Interpretation 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 
 of score No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
60 or more  Standard 
English 
1  1% 0  0% 1  0% 1 1% 2 0% 1 0% 
50 to 59.9 Fairly difficult 0 0% 1 1% 8 3% 2 1% 8 2% 3 1% 
30 to 49.9 Difficult 34 23% 20 28% 77 26% 46 34% 111 25% 66 32% 
21 to 29.9  More difficult 45 31% 19 27% 77 26% 33 24% 122 28% 52 25% 
6 to 20.9  Very difficult 44 30% 17 24% 99 35% 44 32% 143 33% 61 30% 
Lower than 
6 
Extremely 
difficult 
22 15% 14 20% 30 10% 11 8% 52 12% 25 12% 
Total number of explanations 146 100% 71 100% 292 100% 137 100% 438 100% 208 100% 
Mean score 21.9  21.7  23.1  24.2  22.7  23.3  
Maximum score 60.1  53.2  65.5  60.1  65.5  60.1  
Minimum score 0  0  0  0  0  0  
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Table 9 
Quality criterion 5: Complexity of language 2 – Passivity (RQ 1.5). 
Level of passivity FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Zero passivity 51 35% 34 48% 119 40% 49 36% 170 39% 83 40% 
1-25% 25 17% 15 21% 43 15% 23 17% 68 15% 38 18% 
26-50%  47 32% 18 26% 93 32% 37 27% 140 32% 55 27% 
51-75%  7 5% 3 4% 14 5% 18 13% 21  5% 21 10% 
Higher than 75% 16 11% 1 1% 23 8% 10 7% 39 9% 11 5% 
Total number of explanations 146 100% 71 100% 292 100% 137 100% 438 100% 208 100% 
Mean passivity (%)  31%  19%  27%  31%  29%  27% 
Maximum passivity (%)  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Minimum Passivity (%)  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 
Table 10 
Quality criterion 6: Specificity of explanations (RQ 1.6). 
Level of specificity FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 350 
2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 2003 Code 2010 Code 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
 ‘Specific explanation’ 57  39% 36 51% 137 47% 48 35% 194 45% 84 40% 
 ‘General explanation’ 42 29% 16 22% 69  24% 52  38% 111 25% 68 33% 
 ‘No/inadequate explanation’ 47 32% 19 27% 86 29% 37 27% 133 30% 56 27% 
Total number of explanations 146 100% 71 100% 292 100% 137 100% 438 100% 208 100% 
Note: 
See Section 4.6 of the paper for the interpretation of specificity. 
 
